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Following an electoral dispute, the central highlands of the island of Madagascar were subjected
to an economic blockade during the ￿rst half of 2002. After the blockade ended in June 2002, user fees
for health services and school fees were progressively eliminated. This paper examines the provision
of schooling and health services to rural areas of Madagascar before, during, and after the blockade.
We ￿nd that public services were more resilient to the blockade than initially anticipated, but that
health services were more aﬀected than schools. The removal of user fees had a large signi￿cant
eﬀect on public services that is distinct from the end of the blockade and the increase in school book
provision.
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Providing public services such as basic health and education to millions of poor people all over the
world is one of the fundamental challenges of this century. Yet little is known regarding the factors
aﬀecting the supply and demand for these services in poor countries. One issue that has been debated
in the recent literature is the eﬀect of user fees on demand for health and education (e.g. Pradhan &
Prescott 2002, Deininger 2003, Alderman, Orazem & Paterno 2001, Gertler & Glewwe 1990, Behrman
& Knowles 1999). Lack of funding is a major cause for insuﬃcient provision of public services in less
developed countries. Cost recovery in the form of user fees is seen by many as a way of easing funding
constraints, and thereby of increasing supply. Although the importance of adequate funding is not in
dispute, some researchers worry about the eﬀect user fees have on demand, especially among the poor.
Using data from a natural experiment, this paper shows that user fees have a signi￿cant eﬀect on
the provision of health and education. We also examines the eﬀect that political shocks have on social
services. Poor countries are often subjected to riots, blockades, and various forms of warfare. These
political shocks are likely to disrupt the delivery of public services but there is little evidence regarding
the magnitude of the disruption. In particular, it is not known which public services are more resilient and
which are more vulnerable. This paper provides evidence suggesting considerable resilience in primary
and secondary education but much more vulnerability in health care delivery.
The data on the basis of which this paper is written comes from Madagascar, an island with a
population of approximately 16 million people oﬀ the East coast of Africa. In the ￿rst half of 2002,
Madagascar experienced a major political crisis. This crisis was the outcome of a dispute over the
results of a presidential election held in December 2001. The incumbent presidential candidate decided
to blockade the central highlands of the country for several months. The blockade, which lasted from
January to June 2002, aﬀected the delivery of public services in several ways. Essential supplies became
scarce, especially drugs and medical equipment (Programme Ilo 2002b). Fuel prices experienced a six-fold
increase in the central highlands. Energy generation and distribution were also disrupted and poverty
increased dramatically (Fafchamps & Minten 2002). Fortunately, violent confrontation between the two
1sides of the political dispute remained limited and little bloodshed occurred.1
The aftermath of the crisis also introduced massive changes in public service delivery. As a palliative
to the massive increase in poverty generated by the blockade, the new president ordered in August and
September 2002 a (temporary) elimination of health care and school fees. These measures were not
adopted simultaneously in all provinces but rather followed the gradual process of reestablishment of
central authority over the country. By June 2003 ￿ one year later ￿ all provinces had eliminated school
fees and user fees in health care (e.g. Programme Ilo 2003b, Programme Ilo 2003a).
The blockade and the subsequent removal of user fees provides a natural experiment from which to
examine the resilience of public services to massive shocks and the eﬀe c to far e m o v a lo fu s e rf e e so n
public service provision. Data on public service provision were collected immediately before the crisis in
December 2001, at the height of the blockade in June 2001, and during the period of gradual removal of
user fees in November 2002. Collecting data during the blockade put the resourcefulness of our experienced
enumerators to the test as they had to operate in diﬃcult logistical circumstances. These data give us a
rare glimpse into the workings of public service provision under stress.
What makes this paper unique is the fact that these massive changes took place over a very short time
period. Over this short period, location-speci￿c factors aﬀecting the demand and supply of public services
can be regarded as constant ￿ and can be controlled for using ￿xed eﬀects. Under normal conditions,
short panels convey little information because changes occurring over a short period are typically small
in magnitude. As a result, measurement error weakens econometric results. This is less true in our case.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 with a short historical account of the
political crisis that sets the stage for this paper. A simple conceptual framework is introduced in Section
3. The data are presented in Section 4. Descriptive and qualitative evidence is discussed in Section 5.
Econometric results are presented in Section 6 for the education and health sectors. Conclusions and
policy implications are presented at the end.
1Violent confrontation between partisans of the two sides took place nearly exclusively in June 2002, shortly before the
end of the crisis. Approximately 100 casualties were reported in various incidents. The crisis was ended in late June with
the departure from the country of the incumbent presidential candidate.
22. The Political Crisis
The political crisis that sets the stage for our analysis unfolded in Madagascar as a result of the ￿rst round
of the presidential election held in December 2001. The oﬃcial count did not identify a clear winner in
the ￿rst round as the incumbent president (Ratsiraka) was shown to obtain 42% of the votes compared
to 46% of the votes for the opposition leader (Ravalomanana). However, the own polling results of the
opposition leader as well as the results of a donor funded election monitoring committee showed that the
opposition leader gathered enough votes (>50%) in the ￿rst round to be declared the winner.2 Hence,
the opposition leader maintained that election results were rigged.
Major strikes were organized in anticipation of the oﬃcial results and in contestation of the oﬃcial
results as soon as they came out. Thousands of people gathered every day in the capital of Antananarivo
to show their support to the opposition leader. Most of these strikes took place in the capital, the
stronghold of the opposition leader, as he was the popular mayor of the capital just before the elections
and as he belongs to the Merina tribe that lives in the highlands in and around the capital. After a month
of standoﬀ and under popular pressure to move ahead, the opposition leader declared himself president,
formed his own government, and took hold of the ministries in the capital.
The incumbent president Ratsiraka did not accept this turn of events and insisted on a second round
arguing that none of the two candidates obtained the required 50% of the votes. With the support of
governors he had earlier appointed in the coastal provinces, he declared the independence of the ￿ve
coastal provinces and put in place roadblocks to the capital to deal with this ￿unlawful sect￿. In an
eﬀort to strangle the economy of the central province even further, the president and his cronies started
a campaign to blow up several crucial bridges and as such severed transport between provinces.
The overall eﬀect of this dispute was an economic standstill of the country.3 As access to ports was
controlled by the old regime and as no transport between provinces was possible, no fuel could get in
the country (although a small black market in fuel developed).4 From February 2002 onwards, motorized
2The own polling results of the group around the opposition leader showed around 52% of the votes for Ravalomanana.
The election monitoring committee arrived at a number just above 50%. However, none of these two sources had data for
all the voting bureaus.
3In July 2002, the government predicted for 2002 a negative growth of BNP of -10.7% (-19.7% for the secondary sector,
-14.6% for the tertiary sector, -1.2% for the primary sector) (Government of Madagascar 2002).
4This situation continued even after the situation was resolved as the foreign exchange market stopped functioning
3transport became rare in the whole country (in the central as well as the coastal provinces).5. Most ￿rms
t h a th a dt oi m p o r to re x p o r tg o o d sc l o s e dd o w na n dt h en u m b e ro fu n e m p l o y e dw a se s t i m a t e dt or i s et o
around 150,000 in total for the country, most of them in the capital (Government of Madagascar 2002).6
The situation was resolved at the end of June 2002 after the opposition leader secured the support
of the army which gradually took over the coastal provinces. Most of the international community had
recognized Ravalomanana as the new president by the end of June and life slowly returned to normal. In
the beginning of August 2002, most fuel stations were up and running again. Although this crisis proved
dramatic for the people of Madagascar, there are clearly lessons to be learned of the impact of such an
exogenous shock on the functioning of the economy and the delivery of social services.
3. Conceptual framework
The level at which public services are actually provided depends on both supply and eﬀective demand.7
Understanding public service provision therefore requires modeling both. There are many factors that
in￿uence supply and demand for public services. Many of them are time-invariant ￿ or change slowly. In
our empirical analysis, they are controlled for using ￿xed eﬀects and can therefore be omitted from the
discussion of the conceptual framework.
We ￿rst focus on user fees. Let Qit be the quantity of public service actually consumed at time t
in facility i.H o w Qit c a nb em e a s u r e di np r a c t i c ed e p e n d so nt h et i m ef r a m eo ft h ea n a l y s i sa n dt h e
during the crisis and the petroleum companies were unable to pay for deliveries due to this situation. The foreign exchange
market had been closed down as foreign assets of the Malagasy government had been frozen by the French and the American
government after they had received con￿icting letters of two diﬀerent central bank directors (one for each government).
5Alistair Leithead of the BBC documented the black market fuel trade. He reported as follows (BBC, May 23, 2002):
￿About three miles oﬀ the coast a boat laden with fuel, which rumour says comes from South Africa, is illegally moored
and ready to sell in bulk to anyone prepared to make the trip. Dhows, small traditional sailing boats, make the risky
journey... In Mahajanga, the petrol pumps are empty, but the black-market traders sell for 2,500 Malagasy francs, about
35 cents, a litre. But there is not a huge amount of fuel available in the town. Most goes into barrels and heads down
the road to Antananarivo... By the time the barrels cross the [roadblocks] they are worth 9,000 Malagasy francs, $1.20 at
the black-market exchange rate. Some petrol is sold on the way, but it is too risky to enter the city after dark because of
gangsters. They park up and wait for ￿rst light. In Antananarivo, fuel is sold for between 12 and 14,000 Malagasy francs a
litre, $1.75. The people you see in the street siphoning oﬀ the precious liquid into cars and vans pay even more. Ordinary
consumers pay at least double. The political crisis has produced a whole new trade in fuel, becoming more entrenched as
the deadlock continues.￿
6Lack of economic activity also led to lack of income for the government. It was estimated in May 2002 that the
government only obtained 45% of the planned income for that period (Government of Madagascar 2002).
7In the case of public services, the distinction between need and eﬀective demand is particularly acute: many people may
need medical attention, for example, but fail to receive it because they cannot bear the cost. Eﬀective demand normally
increases with income. In contrast, the need for education or health care is typically highest among the poor. In this paper,
we regard the level of provision as an approximate measure of the extent to which the need for public services is actually
met.
4availability of data. The price Pit charged for the service ￿ the user recovery fee ￿ is determined by the
political process and is regarded as exogenous by local providers and consumers. While this assumption
need not be adequate for many parts of the world, it is a fair approximation of what took place in
Madagascar over the short interval under study. With price ￿xed exogenously, the market for local
provision clears through rationing of supply or demand (Benassy 1982).
The supply Sit of public service in facility i depends on the availability of drugs and other materials
Mit. Availability is presumably in￿uenced by the transport cost Cit between facility i and the nearest
supply center, which is typically the nearest large town. In the long run, local supply Sit also depends
on the facility￿s ￿nancial situation and hence ultimately on Pit. While the ￿nancial sustainability of the
recovery fee waiver is in question (e.g. Programme Ilo 2003b, Programme Ilo 2003a), ￿nance does not
appear to have been a separate additional constraint during the period under investigation. Demand for
the service depends on user fee Pit as well as on the income of potential consumers Yit.T h em o r ep o o r
people there are in location i at time t,t h el o w e re ﬀective demand is expected to be, controlling for Pit.
The data generation process can thus be represented as follows:
Qit =m i n fSit;D itg
Sit = S(Mit;·i;￿t)
Dit = D(Pit;Y it;‚ i;￿t)
where greek letters ·i and ‚i denote time-invariant factors aﬀecting the model and ￿t denotes common
time eﬀects. Qit =m i n fSit;D itg because of rationing: if supply is binding and there is excess demand,
Qit = Sit; in contrast, if demand is binding and there is excess supply, then Qit = Dit.8
The above model forms the basis for our testing strategy. Our ￿rst model (Model 1) is a reduced
equation of the form:
Qit = f(Pit;￿t;„ i) (3.1)
8There are many ways by which a rationed market may clear. For instance, bene￿ciaries may be discouraged from
applying for services by long waiting times, short hours of operation, dismissive staﬀ, and bad quality of service. For the
purpose of the analysis presented here, how rationing occurs is inessential and is ignored here.
5where „i is a ￿xed eﬀect speci￿c to facility i. Equation (3.1) is estimated using data from before the
crisis, during the crisis, and after the crisis. It evaluates the net eﬀect of a change in user fee Pit on the
provision of public service Qit.C o e ﬃcients for the time dummies evaluate the aggregate eﬀect of the
blockade and its aftermath on public service delivery.
Equation (3.1) does not, however, control for changes in supply and demand that may have taken
place at the same time. We therefore estimate another, more complete model (Model 2) that includes
supply and demand shifters Mit and Yit. We also include transport costs Cit as proxy variable for other
changes in demand and supply. The estimated model is of the form:
Qit = f(Pit;M it;Y it;C it;￿t;„ i) (3.2)
More complicated models are also conceivable. For instance, it is possible that demand depends
on the quality of service consumers are likely to receive, that is, on Mit. Alternatively, public service
providers may request more Mit from the central government if local demand increases. This makes Mit
endogenous. In the empirical analysis, we control for this possibility by instrumenting Mit.
Before turning to the data, it is important to recognize that the approach described above can only
identify the eﬀect of a change in user fees on short-term provision. In the long run, whether or not
providers collect user fees may have dramatic consequences on the ￿nancial viability of public services.
In the long run, not charging user fees may have dramatic negative consequences on the poor if it erodes
the quality and quantity of health and education services available to them. Subsidized service provision
also generates excess demand and rationing, thereby making it possible for staﬀ to extract side payments.
All these important issues are ignored here.
4. The data
Three types of surveys ￿ at the level of the commune, health center, and school ￿ were organized at the
end of 2002. The main purpose was to evaluate the eﬀect of the political turmoil and of the policy changes
on the functioning of the economy and on the delivery of social services. Most questions were therefore
formulated as recall questions on the period before (November/December 2001), during (May/June 2002)
6and following the political crisis (November/December 2002).
Data collection was undertaken by the USAID-funded Ilo program, in collaboration with INSTAT
and FOFIFA.9 This project has a long experience collecting data in Madagascar and had at the end
of 2001 completed a socioeconomic census of all communes in the country. The commune census was
used to set up a strati￿ed sampling frame in a way to have the collected data be representative of the
rural situation at the national and provincial level. Fivondronona (districts) were divided in six strata
depending on the distance to the capital of the province (close, medium, far) and on the availability of
a tarred road. In each strata, one ￿vondronana was selected for every province. In each ￿vondronana
(36 out of 111 in total), four communes were selected randomly. Via interviews with key informants and
focus groups ￿ typically local administrators, public servants, traders and farmers ￿ the survey collected
detailed information on the socio-economic situation at the commune level. This communal survey was
only held in rural communes given the diﬃculty to obtain reliable overall estimates on the heterogeneous
population of large urban centers.
The results of the focus group interviews illustrate the dramatic impact of the political crisis (Tables
1 and 2). As the regular distribution channels of fuel were disrupted during the political crisis, prices
of fuel skyrocketed (as it was only available on the black market). This led to a doubling of transport
costs for personal travel as well for shipping of goods (Table 1). It led also to a dramatic reduction in the
availability of means of transport. 80% of motorized transport was estimated to have been immobilized
during the crisis (Government of Madagascar 2002). The transport situation improved after the political
crisis was resolved but transportation costs at the time of post-crisis survey had not come down to the
level of before the crisis.
During the crisis, prices of imported goods increased dramatically while goods not made locally became
unavailable. Prices for basic consumption goods (salt, sugar, vegetable oil, kerosene) at least doubled.
Producer prices decreased slightly during the crisis ￿ and the number of traders that bought producer
goods declined due to the problems with transport ￿ while agricultural wages remained stagnant (Table
2). Consequently, the purchasing power of rural households declined and poverty increased signi￿cantly
9INSTAT is the statistical institute of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. FOFIFA is the agricultural research center
within the Ministry of Scienti￿cR e s e a r c h .
7due to the political crisis. Almost two thirds of commune focus groups stated that the eﬀect of the
political crisis was the worst welfare shock in the commune over the last ten years ￿ in a country that
is regularly hit by cyclones, droughts, plant diseases or locus invasions. To have some quantitative idea
on the eﬀect of the political crisis on monetary income, communal focus groups were asked to evaluate
its evolution for an average household in the commune. According to focus group estimates, the income
of an average household decreased by almost 50% during the crisis and at the end of the year was 20%
lower compared to the same period the previous year (Table 2).
Focus groups were asked to evaluate the percentage of the population that had diﬃculties or was
unable to pay for costs related to health care and schooling. While admittedly a crude method, this
number turned out during pre-testing to be quite easy to estimate. In our analysis, we use this number
as an indication of poverty and demand changes in the commune. Survey results indicates that the poor
rose by 6% on average (13% for the median) during the crisis (Table 1). This is a dramatic increase given
that we are comparing the harvest period (May/June) to the lean period (November/December). Using
the same period in the year, the post-crisis poverty level shows an average increase of 2% (5% for the
median) compared to the previous year.10 As the transportation blockade was resolved in July, it seems
that people were able to get back to business as usual and by the end of the year had made up for some
lost earnings.
A key objective of the survey was to study the impact the political crisis and the ensuing reduction in
user fees on social services. To this eﬀect, health centers and schools were visited and surveyed separately.
There is a health center in every commune in Madagascar. This health center was visited in every sampled
commune. On average, 24 health centers were surveyed per province. The number of visits per month in
the health center is used as a proxy for the quantity of public services actually consumed Qit.
In each commune, there are a large number of public primary schools. Two of them were sampled:
one in the center of the commune and one ￿remote￿ school that was at least 3 kilometers away from the
center. Some 284 schools were visited in total. For schools, the total number of students in the primary
school is used as dependent variable Qit in our analysis.
10Other data sources con￿rm the magnitude of these numbers. Using a detailed expenditure survey that was done at the
end of 2001 and at the end of 2002, INSTAT (2003) estimates rural poverty to have increased by 9%.
8Table 1 illustrates the signi￿cant increase of the number of books given to the schools after the crisis.
This is mostly due to the activities of a World Bank ￿nanced program (CRESED) that markedly increased
its disbursement in the aftermath of the crisis. In the regression analysis, we use the number of books as
our measure of quality Mit for education. In the case of health care, we use the availability of a working
fridge as proxy variable for Mit.11 To control for potential endogeneity of Mit,w eu s et h en u m b e ro f
media outlets, the price of rice, and the proportion of ethnic highlanders in the commune population as
instrumenting variables. We have no reason to suspect that changes in these variables over time would
aﬀect public service delivery directly. Descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1.
5. Public service provision during the study period
Before turning to the econometric analysis per se, we examine the descriptive evidence in detail. The
functioning of the health and education sectors was seriously aﬀected during the study period due to
demand and supply changes. We ￿rst discuss supply and demand shocks in the health sector. Next we
examine supply and demand shifts in education during the study period.
5.1. The health sector
Manpower in this sector was surprisingly resilient during the crisis: there is anecdotal evidence that some
health staﬀ were not able to report for work, but this was not an overall trend (Table 2).12 Some health
centers adjusted to the crisis through a reduction in opening hours, especially in urban centers. This
was generally implemented to allow staﬀ more time to walk home given the lack of motorized transport.
When the transport crisis was over, opening hours were adjusted back to the pre-crisis schedule.
Another indication of supply changes is the evolution of the availability of diﬀerent medicines. We
measure drug availability by taking a simple average of the most frequently used medicines. According
this measure, availability of medicines declined from 89% to 73% between December/January 2002 and
11Other available measures of health or schooling quality either did not change much over the duration of our short panel,
or were too endogenous to be useful. The availability of drugs is a good illustration: survey results show that availability of
drugs fell after the end of the crisis. This is undoubtedly a result of a sharp increase in visits by patients. Given the small
size of our sample and the diﬃculty of ￿nding suitable instruments, it is best to focus on one key quality indicator.
12For Madagascar as a whole, the Ministry of Health estimates that during the crisis around 250 doctors left the health
center to which they were assigned. At the time of the survey, 181 had returned to their post.
9May/June 2002 and got even slightly worse after the crisis (Table 2). The worsening situation after the
crisis has been blamed on an increase in the number of visits resulting from the change in pricing policy
of the new government, and on the bad organization of the distribution of the free medicines.13
Access to electricity in rural areas did not show any major change during the crisis (Table 2).14 Some
50% of the public rural health centers did not have electricity before the crisis and this proportion only
increased marginally during the crisis. More worrisome was the situation with fridges, used to store
medicines and vaccines. While 73% of the health centers had a working fridge before the crisis started,
this number dropped to 56% in June (Table 1). The reason for the decline was lack of gas and fuel, the
major sources of power for fridges in rural areas.
Given the dramatic circumstances, the supply side of the health sector appears to have been sur-
prisingly little aﬀected by the transportation shock. The obvious explanation is that only motorized
transport was touched by the crisis. The supply side of the health sector was thus only aﬀected for these
goods and services that depend on motorized transport. However, while the supply side was less aﬀected
than expected, this does not mean that the use of health services stayed constant. As shown in Table 1,
the median number of visits to health centers dropped. The staﬀ at the health center were asked to voice
their opinion on the reason for change. Their responses are summarized in Table 3. The major perceived
reason for the drop in the number of visits to health centers during the crisis was the increase in poverty.
In 54% of the health centers that noticed a drop in the number of visits, the staﬀ of the center related
t h i st ot h ei n c r e a s eo fp o v e r t ya n dt h ei n a b i l i t yo fp e o p l et op a yt h ef e e s( T a b l e3 ) . 15 Only in 17% of the
cases did they explain the drop in visits by a lack of staﬀ or medicines.
This state of aﬀairs was one of the reasons the new government intervened after the crisis. To reduce
the welfare impact of increased poverty, the pricing policy of public services was changed. The new
president declared in August that user fees would (temporarily) be abolished in public health centers.
13After the crisis, SALAMA, the governmental medicine distribution center, bought 20 billion Fmg (3 billion $) worth of
medecines for free distribution. Since these medecines were only distributed by the end of December, they are not captured
in our survey.
14The new government was able to bring in occasional supplies of fuel in well protected convoys. This fuel was used as
part of a strategic stock to keep electricity going and for other essential activities.
15It was stated that in case of illness, patients who no longer came to health centers either did not seek formal services
at all or did visit traditional healers. The people in charge of the health estimated that, if there was a drop in the number
of visits in their center during the crisis, a signi￿cant part of their normal patients did not receive any treatment at all
anymore. A quarter of the centers said that patients would go to traditional healers. This is especially the case for rural
areas. It is only in urban centers that patients seemed to have had at least partial substitution possibilities.
10This policy, however, was unevenly applied in space and time. Table 1 shows that simple medicines and
consultations were oﬀered for free in 15% of the public rural health centers before the crisis. By the time
the survey team visited them in November 2002, only 74% of surveyed health centers were refraining
from charging user fees. The reason for this was the new government took time to assert its authority
in all provinces. The new policy was well applied in the central province of Antananarivo where 93% of
the public centers had abolished fees by the time of the survey. In that part of the country, the median
month for abolishment was August. This compares to the northern province of Antsiranana where only
55% had abolished cost recovery policies by November.
Table 1 shows the mean and the median of the number of visits to health centers in the period
December 2002, May/June 2002 and December 2003. Compared to the situation prior to the crisis, the
number of visits to public rural health centers decreased slightly during the crisis period and increased
signi￿cantly afterwards.16 Monthly visits post-crisis almost doubled compared to the previous year.
Answers to qualitative questions asked to health staﬀ indicate that the main perceived reason for the
increase in the number of visits is the elimination of user fees (Table 3).
Studies in other settings have shown that poorer non-educated households are hurt more by macro-
economic shocks (e.g. Glewwe & Hall 1998, Frankenberg, Smith & Thomas 2003). Pro-poor policies have
not been followed in health service delivery in Madagascar (e.g. Glick & Razakamamantsoa 2001, Glick,
Raza￿ndravonona & Randretsa 2000, Castro-Leal, Dayton, Demery & Mehra 1999). The poorer part
of the population is thus more likely to shift away from formal health services in response to a large
negative macro-economic shock simple because they can no longer aﬀord it. This seems to have been the
eﬀect of the political crisis in Madagascar, based on the perceptions of the persons in charge of the health
center. The mean and median of the drop in visits of the poorer part of the population indicates that
their perceived number of visits is down by 35%. This compares to a perceived doubling of the visits of
the poor post-crisis, which is generally attributed to the abolishment of user fees. In Section 5, we use
multivariate statistical analysis to disentangle income and price eﬀects.
16One health center in one of the communes closed down completely. Given that no data were available on this health
center, it was not taken into account for further analysis.
115.2. The education sector
The impact of the political crisis was also ￿ but less ￿ visible in the education sector (Lassabille &
Tan 2003). As in the health sector, working hours were reduced. Some 56% of schools experience
interruptions in teaching, mostly due to strikes and rallies in favor of the two presidential candidates. In
urban areas, all schools were aﬀected and, on average, cancelled classes for 58 days (Programme Ilo 2002a).
After the end of the strikes, the teaching schedule was re-organized (as in health centers) to better face
the transportation problems caused by fuel shortages. In general, this change led to a reduction in the
total number of hours of class per day. Due to these changes, the required annual number of hours of
classes was not reached during the academic year 2001/2002.17
Mostly due to reasons linked with the political crisis, the passing rate at the CEPE, a standardized
national examination at the end of the primary school, showed a signi￿cant 13% decline (Table 2).18 The
rate of child absenteeism increased by 20% in May 2002 compared to the ￿rst trimester of the school
year. This increased has been blamed by survey respondents on child labor as well as on the diﬃculties
encountered by parents in paying for the school expenses (school fees, food, and transportation). Similar
eﬀects of a decrease of income on education have been documented in other low income countries (e.g.
Basu 1999, Jacoby & Skou￿as 1997, Ablett & Slengesol 1999, Thomas, Beegle, Frankenberg, Sikoki,
Strauss & Teruel 2001, Davies 1996). However, child absenteeism should not entirely be attributed to
the crisis. Demand for child labor always increases in April-May in rural areas because it corresponds to
the harvest period of rice, the major staple in Madagascar. Only to the extent that households￿ income
decreased due to the crisis and that the rural families had to rely more on family labor instead of wage
labor can we say that the crisis contributed to an increase of the child labor that led to more absenteeism
than in a normal year.
The overall presence of the teachers was seemingly little aﬀected by the crisis (Table 2). The number
of teachers that abandoned their post did not change signi￿cantly compared to a normal year. Salaries
17The political crisis created disturbances in the school year calendar. If the school year normally ends in late June,
the oﬃcial examinations that mark the end of the school year were delayed for about 1 month. Moreover, the school year
2002-2003 started only in the ￿rst week of October, although it was initially expected to start in mid-September.
18The high decrease for the passing rate in the province of Antsiranana (49% in 2000/2001 compared to 14% in 2001/2002)
is partly explained by confusion on the CEPE exam. In most of the province two exams were administered (referred to as
the Ratsiraka exam and the Ravelomanana exam). Only a small minority of students showed up for the second exam which
was held one month into their normal vacation period.
12were mostly paid during the crisis as only around 10% of the schools reported a delay or a stop in the
payment of salaries.19 The transportation problem seem to have caused two types of delays: it took
teachers longer to get to the capital of the Fivondronana, where they receive their salary, and sometimes
the arrival of their salaries was delayed in the capital of the Fivondronana. However, while few teachers
abandoned teaching altogether, an increase in teachers absenteeism was noticed compared to the period
before the crisis.
In response to the expected negative impact of the political crisis, the new president changed user
fee policies in the education sector as well and announced that the government would waive the tuition
fee for the school year 2002/2003. Each student inscription would lead to an extra allocation of 10,000
Fmg (15,000 Fmg for the capital) towards the school.20 However, the distribution of these funds was not
without diﬃculties. Most the public schools had not received these funds at the beginning of the school
year. At the moment of the survey in November, only 41% of the public primary schools had received all
or part of the promised funds. Therefore, a signi￿cant number of schools asked parents to pay a tuition
fee. The schools that asked for a tuition did so mostly to deal with liquidity problem caused by the late
arrival of the funds.21
Primary school enrollment rates in the school year 2002/2003 increased dramatically. They increased
by 15% compared to the previous school year for the public primary school as a whole (Table 1). The
number of ￿r s tg r a d es t u d e n t si n c r e a s e de v e nb y2 0 %( T a b l e2 ) . E v e ni nh i g h e ry e a r s ,t h ei n c r e a s ei n
the number of students is signi￿cantly above population growth. To have more insights in the perceived
reason for the change in the number of students, school staﬀ of the school were asked why they thought
the change occurred. The major reason mentioned for the increase is the decrease in schooling costs. This
is not the only reason, however: other reasons make up 30% of the explanations (Table 3).22 Enrollment
19In the communes situated far from the capital in each province, the delay in the payment of the salaries has had an
impact on absence of teachers: while the average number of days of absence per month is estimated at 1 or 2 days, the
teachers were reported during the crisis to be absent for 5 to 10 days per month.
20One part of this amount, theoretically not higher than 7500 Fmg, would be used towards the payment of the general
costs and inscription costs. The rest would be used towards the school budget (￿Caisse Ecole￿).
21of the economy and the lack of income seem to have led to a liquidity problem for most households during the crisis
and therefore, monthly school fees for the private schools could not be paid in some cases: 19 per cent of the students in
the private schools are reported - an estimate by the school staﬀ - to not be able to regularly or entirely pay their fees.
However, private schools oﬀered adjustments. While school fees did not change signi￿cantly during the crisis compared to
the period before, almost all schools allowed parents to pay school fees later than normal.
22One explanation was extra eﬀorts to explain the utility of schooling to the local population. Another important reason
(esp. in the central and eastern regions) that was mentioned was the availability of a birth certi￿cate. While children did
13rates could have risen even more as 20% of the schools reported that they had to refuse students due to
the lack of space (Table 2).
6. Econometric analysis
The descriptive and qualitative evidence presented in the previous section suggests that the large changes
that aﬀected the provision of health and education services in Madagascar were driven at least in part
by an increase in poverty during the crisis and the removal of user fees after the crisis. However, we
also found evidence of supply shifts, particularly in the availability of school books, drugs and working
fridges. To disentangle the respective eﬀects of these various factors, we need to rely on the multivariate
approach outlined in Section 3. To this we now turn.
Our strategy is to use variation across the sample in changes across period to isolate the respective
eﬀects of supply and demand shifts. Fortunately, we have a lot of variation across the sample, which
makes identi￿cation possible in spite of the small size of the sample. For instance, the drop in the number
of patient visits during the crisis is not identical across health centers: one center reports a drop to 9%
of its pre-crisis level while another reports almost a fourfold increase. Similar cross-section variation is
noticed in the period after the crisis.
We begin by estimating a reduced-form model (Model 1). Estimated coeﬃcients are presented in
Table 4. The ￿rst column measures the eﬀect on health care. Our dependent variable is the number of
visits by patients to each health center covered by the survey. The second column measures the eﬀect
on education. Student enrollment is our measure of the quantity of education services consumed by the
population. Both dependent variables are in logs, as well as school fees.23 Coeﬃcients thus have the
usual elasticity interpretation. Both regressions are estimated using ￿xed eﬀects speci￿c to each facility.
Coeﬃcients of the time dummies suggest that the blockade (period 2) and subsequent recovery (period
3) had large eﬀects on the provision of public services across the sample. The eﬀect is particularly
noticeable in health care, where the number of visits dropped by 17% in June 2002 relative to December
have to possess a birth certi￿cate before to be accepted in public schools, this condition was annulated in a signi￿cant
number of communes post-crisis. Alternatively, communes made sure that enough copies were available this year to ensure
that more children could go to school.
23To avoid losing zero observations after taking logs, we take the log of school fees plus 1 FMG.
142001. Perhaps even more remarkable is the expansion of service in November 2002, with an average
increase of 39% for health care and 8% for school enrollment relative to December 2001.
The eﬀect of user fees is also clearly apparent in the results, as both coeﬃcients are signi￿cant. A
16% increase in the number of visits to health centers is associated with the elimination of user fees. To
interpret the school fee coeﬃcient, note that the average log of school fees is 6.5. A coeﬃcient of 0.01
thus means that an elimination of school fees is associated with a 6.5% increase in school enrollment. The
order of magnitude of this elasticity may appear small but one should keep in mind that it only measures
a short-term response to a temporary measure. The policy measure is temporary, so parents who enroll
an additional child in school expect to pay the school fee in the future. If the abolishment of school fee
were made permanent, we would expect a larger response. Moreover, as far as the eﬀect of school fees
on school entry is concerned, children who enter school for the ￿rst time are normally enrolled in school
around a given age. Consequently, only children who are within that age range may be aﬀected by the
measure; older kids who never went to school or dropped out at a young age are unlikely to reenter school
in response to a change in fee. For these reasons, we would expect the long-term response to a change in
user fee to be stronger (Glick & Sahn 2001).
As discussed in the conceptual section, Model 1 does not adequately control for demand and supply
shifters. We therefore reestimate the model with additional controls. Results are summarized in Table
5. The ￿rst and third column report straight ￿xed eﬀect estimates; the third and fourth column report
estimates in which the availability of a working fridge and the number of books distributed to schools are
instrumented. We ￿rst discuss uninstrumented results.
We begin by noting that the results from Table 4 are con￿rmed and, in general, magni￿ed by the
inclusion of additional demand and supply shifters. The blockade is associated with a 26% drop in visits
to health centers and a 3% drop in school enrollment. In contrast, the expansion of service in late
2002 represents a 26% increase in health center visits relative to December 2001, and a 7% increase in
school enrollment. User fees remain signi￿cant and their coeﬃcient is larger: a removal of user fee is now
associated with a 21% increase in health center visits and a 9% increase in school enrollment (0:014£6:5).
Supply shifters have the expected sign: the availability of a working fridge (used to store vaccines and
15medicines) tends to raise health center visits while the free distribution of books to a school raises school
enrollment. The latter eﬀect, however, is not signi￿cant. Demand also has the anticipated eﬀect. Our
demand shifter is the proportion of poor in the commune where the facility is located. Poverty ￿gures
were collected in each of the three survey visits. Results show a strong eﬀect of poverty on health care:
the average 13% increase in poverty between December 2001 and June 2002 is associated with a 3.7%
drop in health center visits. The eﬀect is strongly signi￿cant. In contrast, the eﬀect on school enrollment
of short-term changes in poverty is not signi￿cant. This ￿nding contradicts research ￿ndings by Jacoby &
Skou￿as (1997) and by Sawada (2002) in South Asia. These authors show that temporary shocks induce
households to withdraw children from school. A similar eﬀect is not observed here, possibly because the
blockade aﬀected families late in the academic year when enrollment decisions had already been made,
and was resolved before new enrollment decisions were made for the following academic year.
Contrary to expectations, we ￿nd that changes in transport costs did not have a direct eﬀect on public
service provision once we control for time dummies and demand and supply shifters. Transport costs,
however, are found to have a negative eﬀect on these shifters: locations in which the cost of transport to
the nearest major town increased more during the blockade endured a larger increase in poverty and a
larger reduction in supply factors.
Columns 2 and 4 of Table 5 present regression results in which we instrument supply shifters. The
reason for doing so was explained in Section 3: changes in demand may incite facilities to secure more
inputs Mit from the central government. To control for this possibility, we instrument the availability of
a fridge and the number of books distributed to the school. Instrumenting regressions are presented in
Table 6. Our instruments are the number of media outlets in the commune, the number of media outlets
interacted with period 3, the price of rice in the commune, and the share of ethnic highland people in
the commune crossed with period 3. The number of media outlets is a proxy for communication devices
between the commune and the central government; presumably, communes that have more media outlets
are better informed about what goes on in the capital city, and thus better able to communicate their
requests and grievances to central government. We also interact this variable with the period 3 dummy
to re￿ect the change in government that took place in the Summer and the widespread changes in public
16service delivery that ensued. The price of rice is used as proxy for the price level in the commune: places
where prices increased more during ￿ decreased less after ￿ the blockade may lobby for more government
support in the form of supplies.24 Finally, ethnicity may aﬀect the responsiveness of central government
to local demands. Inhabitants of Madagascar descend from two main settlement waves: Malays who
settled predominantly in the highlands (many centuries ago) and Africans who settled primarily on the
West coast. Although the two populations are now largely mixed, descendants from highland settlers
have traditionally dominated island politics. As a result, we expect them better able to bene￿tf r o mt h e
large political changes occurring in period 3.25 Instruments are jointly signi￿cant, as con￿rmed by the
F-test reported at the bottom of Table 6. Overidenti￿cation test results also con￿rm that instruments
can safely be regarded as exogenous in the service provision regressions.
Instrumenting regressions by and large con￿rm our expectations. Communes where the price of rice
grew more than elsewhere are also those where fridges were more available. Communes with more ethnic
highlanders and more media outlets (nearly signi￿cant) received more school books from the central
government. We also ￿nd that transport costs have a large negative impact on the availability of a
working fridge.
T u r n i n gb a c kt oT a b l e5 ,w e￿nd that instrumented results by and large resemble uninstrumented
ones. It is therefore not surprising that, in both cases, a Davidson-MacKinnon test fails to ￿nd evidence
of endogeneity. Instrumented regression results are nevertheless less precise, with several coeﬃcients no
longer signi￿cant. Since endogeneity turned out not to be a concern after all, instrumented results should
not be given too much weight.
7. Conclusions
This study looks at public service delivery in the face of a policy shock and change in user fee. The eﬀect of
those on public service delivery has been a hotly debated issue ever since structural adjustment programs
have been put in place and especially since the Asian crisis (e.g. Cornia, Jolly & Stewart 1987, Sahn &
24The validity of this instrument hinges on the fact that poverty is measured not by nominal income but as a percentage
of the population that is poor. Consequently, much of the possible eﬀect of a change in rice price on demand for services is
capture by our poverty variable.
25The use of all four instruments in both instrumenting regressions is for convenience and symmetry only. Virtually
identical results are obtained if we drop non-signi￿cant instruments.
17Bernier 1995, Sahn, Dorosh & Younger 1997, Stewart & Ranis 1999). However, good microdata that
measure the impact of macroeconomic shocks and changes in user fees have been lacking.
Madagascar provided the stage for a natural experiment to ascertain the eﬀect of such changes. A
d i s p u t er e g a r d i n gt h eo u t c o m eo ft h ep r e s i d e n t i a le l e c t i o nh e l di nD e c e m b e r2 0 0 1l e dt oa6m o n t h - l o n g
blockade of the central highlands. When this blockade was ￿nally lifted, the new president temporarily
suspended user fees in schools and health centers. This measure, however, was not applied immediately
in all rural communes, due to political uncertainty and imperfect communication with the capital. This
sequence of events provides a natural experiment to study the eﬀect of a macro-economic shock and a
reduction in user fees on public service provision.
Geographical isolation also plays a role in social service delivery. It has long been noted that public
services provision in poor countries is better in urban than rural areas. But it is not entirely clear why
this is the case. Supply may be lower in rural area ￿ because of high delivery costs due to low population
density, transport costs to rural areas, capacity to attract quali￿ed staﬀ, etc. Demand may also be lower
because rural incomes are lower. This paper provides evidence indicating that, contrary to expectations,
variations in transport costs over time do not have a major impact on service provision. Poverty, in
contrast, has a large signi￿cant negative eﬀect on health care.
We ￿nd that the education sector showed the least eﬀe c t so ft h es h o c k . S o m es c h o o l sh a dt oc l o s e
during two months of strike and then had to deal with transportation diﬃculties triggered by the rapid
increase in fuel prices. The sector nevertheless adjusted to face these problems. The teaching schedule
and the timing of the 2001/2002 and 2002/2003 school years were adjusted and payment facilities for
school fees were put in place to allow students to ￿nish their school year. These ￿ndings came as a
pleasant surprise to most observers who expected more dramatic consequences.26
The dramatic eﬀects that were predicted in the health sector (Harris 2002) did not realize either.
As the health sector depends more on outside deliveries than the education sector, this sector was more
aﬀected by the transportation shock induced by the political crisis. However, all the activities that
involved only local transport continued. Again, the government adjusted in the face of the shock. In this
26Cameron (2002) shows similar eﬀects in a study on the eﬀect of the Indonesian crisis on children: school attendance
dropped slightly after the onset of the crisis but rebounded afterwards to higher than pre-crisis levels.
18case, the government used its strategic fuel stock, to the extent possible, to keep electricity and fridges
running. Some hospitals reduced consultation fees to allow patients to continue to use their services and
donors intervened to bring in medicines. Hence, the major cause of the decline in visits to hospitals was
not lack of supplies but the lack of liquidity for households to pay for health care.
This study has shown a high resilience of service delivery. The results, based on qualitative and
quantitative evidence, indicate that the decline in the use of services was in most cases not a supply
problem as a signi￿cant number of hospitals and schools continued to deliver services. Most of the drop
i se x p l a i n e db yt h el a c ko fi n c o m ea n da ni n c r e a s ei np o v e r t yw h i c hl e dt oad e c r e a s ei na c c e s st ol i q u i d i t y
and an increase in opportunity costs of the time of children. The role of demand is further emphasized by
the signi￿cant increase in visits to health centers and school enrollment that followed the elimination of
user fees. These results suggest that, in order to mitigate the eﬀects of macro-economic shocks on access
to public services, more attention should therefore be paid to the demand side, while keeping in mind
that the long-run ￿nancial viability of public service delivery is essential to ensure continued provision.
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22Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables used in regression analysis
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Nov./Dec. 2001 May/June 2002 Nov./Dec. 2002
Variable  Unit median mean  std. dev. median mean  std. dev. median mean  std. dev.
1. Public health center
Number of visits per month Number per health ctr 62.50 117.44 320.72 50.00 117.35 478.49 104.62 208.23 622.82
Availability of working fridge Yes=1 1.00 0.73   1.00 0.56   1.00 0.70  
Fee Yes=1 1.00 0.85   1.00 0.84   0.00 0.26  
No of observations 138 138 138
2. Public school
Number of students Number per school 181.00 243.82 195.90 168.00 229.68 183.69 209.00 280.37 226.83
Number of books Number per school 0.00 35.48 102.95 0.00 35.48 102.95 81.50 136.95 172.63
Fee Malagasy franc 3000.00 4172.46 3316.72 3000.00 4172.46 3316.72 0.00 1741.73 3603.94
No of observations 282 282 284
3. Commune
Transport costs to major city Malagasy franc 25000.00 37037.88 33553.33 62750.00 73965.38 61002.42 35000.00 46793.23 42852.38
Media outlets (radio, TV) Number 1.09 1.09 0.88 1.09 1.12 0.90 1.09 1.11 0.90
Price of rice Fmg/kapoaka 700.00 726.42 281.89 650.00 689.97 356.45 750.00 784.18 332.18
No of temporary and chronic poor % of pop. in commune  55.00 53.75 24.72 68.00 60.49 26.72 60.00 55.65 25.07
Ethnic group of highlands % of pop. in commune  6.00 32.47 41.78 6.00 32.47 41.78 6.00 32.47 41.78
No of observations 138 138 138Table 2: Public service provision
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Unit Nov./Dec. 2001 May/June 2002 Nov./Dec. 2002
1. Public health center
Average number of staff per center Number 4.09 4.05 4.09
Availability of medicines index# 0.86 0.73 0.72
Availability of electricity % 50.35 48.94 50.35
Perceived average change in the number of visits by  
poor patients compared to last year same time## % -27%** +55%
2. Public school
Number of teachers per school Number 5.13 5.01 5.10
Number of students grade 1 Number 80.28 76.16 96.55
Number of students grade 2 Number 54.24 50.71 59.81
Number of students grade 3 Number 49.37 46.77 54.63
Number of students grade 4 Number 34.20 31.57 39.11
Number of students grade 5 Number 25.71 24.47 30.28
Schools that refused students due to lack of space % 17.60 20.77 .
Passing rate at CEPE* previous school year % 59.94 46.86
If decrease, reason
Insufficient number of courses due to crisis % 18.60
Lack of concentration due to crisis % 44.19
Other reason linked to crisis % 17.05
Reason independent of crisis % 20.16
Total % 100.00
3. Commune
Price of paddy Fmg/kg 1825 1650 1977
Price of salt Fmg/kg 369 1168 566
Price of sugar Fmg/kg 5392 12034 6357
Price of kerosene Fmg/kg 3671 14434 5047
Price vegetable oil Fmg/l 7727 15654 10677
Agricultural wage level (male) Fmg/day 8407 8675 8893
Perceived evolution monetary income avg hh
compared to last year same time % -46%** -20%
During the last ten years, political crisis  
was worst event for welfare in the commune 1=yes; % 64% .
#: simple average of the availability (1=yes; 0=no) of oral contraceptives, condoms, aspirin, paracetamol,
amoxyciline,cotrimoxazole, peniciline, doxycycline, tetracycline, anti-malaria, vaccines BCG, polio, DTCoq, 
rougeole, oral hydratation
##: perception of the staff of the health center
*: national standarized test at the end of primary school
**: only based on half of the sample visited in April/May 2002
.Table 3: Perceived reasons for change in public service use (compared to the same period last year)
Number Percentage
1. Public health center
If decrease of visits, major reason for decrease during the crisis*
Transport costs have increased 2 2  
Lack of staff or medicines 17 22  
People are not able anymore to pay fees 38 51  
Other 18 24  
Total 75 100  
If decrase of visits, major reason for decrease after crisis  
Lack of staff 4 19
Lack of medicines 9 43
Patients can’t pay tariffs 3 14
Other 5 24
Total 21 100
If increase of visits, major reason for increase after crisis
Better quality of service 4 4
Patients don’t go to other centers anymore 7 6
Reduction cost of medicines 49 45




Major reason for absenteism during crisis*
Lack of teachers 2 2
Parents could not pay the school fees 0 0
Parents could not buy school supplies 2 2
Food problems 42 50
Child labor 20 24
Strike 4 5
Others (malaria epidemics…) 14 17
Total 84 100
If decrease of students, most important reason for decrease after crisis
Lack of teachers 7 17
Parents unable to pay for schooling costs 3 7
Parents unable to pay for supplies 6 15
Parents unable to pay for food 6 15
Children have to work 7 17
Other  12 29
Total 41 100
If increase of students, most important reason of increase after crisis    
Lower transport costs 2 1
More teachers 7 3
Reduction schooling costs 147 71
Other  51 25 .
Total 207 100
*: only asked for the centers/schools in three provinces (Fianarantsoa, Mahajanga, Antananarivo)
Rural centers/schoolsTable 4: Short model results (fixed effect; three period panel)
Variable  Unit Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Fee  log(amount) -0.012 -3.66
Fee yes=1 -0.169 -1.77
Panel period 2 Period 2=1 -0.170 -3.09 -0.055 -3.67
Panel period 3 Period 3=1 0.364 4.43 0.072 3.08




R-square within 0.369 0.259
  between 0.000 0.013
  overall 0.068 0.005
Number of observations   403 827
Number of groups    139 281
Log(No of students) log(No of visits health center)Table 5: Long model results (fixed effects; three period panel)
Variable  Unit Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Availability of working fridge* yes=1 0.242 2.81 0.203 0.43
Fee yes=1 -0.214 -2.23 -0.210 -1.91
Number of books* log(number) 0.003 0.59 0.046 1.45
Fee log(amount) -0.014 -3.73 -0.010 -2.17
% of temporary and chronic poor log(poor) -0.288 -3.44 -0.286 -3.20 -0.001 -0.04 -0.032 -0.93
Transport costs to major city log(amount) 0.173 1.64 0.165 1.19 -0.034 -1.06 -0.032 -0.94
Panel period 2 period 2=1 -0.262 -2.70 -0.263 -2.68 -0.028 -0.99 -0.027 -0.86
Panel period 3 period 3=1 0.268 3.02 0.273 2.60 0.068 2.37 -0.028 -0.36
Intercept 3.546 3.14 3.637 2.33 5.657 16.56 5.681 15.45
     
sigma_u 0.973 0.971 0.7998 0.789
sigma_e 0.416 0.417 0.1800 0.194
rho 0.845   0.844   0.9518 0.943
R-square within 0.429 0.428 0.2559 0.140
  between 0.004 0.005 0.0013 0.032
  overall 0.024 0.024 0.0118 0.033
Davidson-MacKinnon endogeneity test
error-term instrumental regression -0.147 -0.30 -0.044 -1.48
Number of observations 369 369 762 762
Number of groups  131 131 267 267
*: instrumented in 2SLS
log(No. of visits health center)
OLS 2SLS
log(No. of students)
OLS 2SLSTable 6: Instrumenting regressions (fixed effect; three period panel)
Variable  Unit Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value
Fee yes=1 0.125 1.71
Fee log(amount) -0.080 -2.43
% of temporary and chronic poor log(poor) 0.034 0.54 0.681 2.98
Transport costs to major city log(amount) -0.187 -2.37 -0.057 -0.20
Panel period 2 period 2=1 -0.012 -0.17 -0.016 -0.06
Panel period 3 period 3=1 0.041 0.51 1.996 6.46
Number of media outlets log(number) 0.213 1.21 1.078 1.64
Number of media outlets*panel 3 log(number) 0.049 1.21 -0.122 -0.69
Prix of rice  log(Fmg/kg) 0.253 2.10 0.000 0.24
% of ethnic group of highlands*panel 3 % of pop.     0.011 3.12
Intercept 0.752 0.55 -1.470 -0.46
   
sigma_u 0.534 1.950
sigma_e 0.314 1.641
rho 0.743 0.585  
R-square within 0.152   0.482
  between 0.007   0.002
  overall 0.020   0.166
Test for joint significance of instruments F(3,230) Prob>F F(4,486) Prob>F
2.510 0.059 3.500 0.008
Number of observations 369 762
Number of groups  131 267
Availability fridge (yes=1) Log(No of books)